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Indexation policies and practices are common in many markets
and economies. In most cases, price adjustment mechanisms arise
in private contracts as a consequence of high and pervasive infla-
tion. Sometimes governments also play an important role in pro-
moting the use of indexation in their issues of public debt, taxation
systems, public tariff settings, and other institutional arrangements.
Although practices that can generally be classified as index-
ation are widespread in most modern economies, this topic re-
mains highly controversial. On the one hand, from a microeconomic
point of view, it is clear that indexation facilitates economic ar-
rangements and contracts between private agents under high and
even under moderate inflation. In particular, indexation allows
the system of relative prices to survive large inflation shocks. Wage
and financial indexation are clear examples of arrangements that
accomplish this purpose. Wage indexation substitutes for the need
for frequent renegotiation of wages and may reduce labor market
transactions costs in economies where inflation is at least moder-
ate. And the experience of several emerging economies shows that
indexing financial instruments may be key to success in develop-
ing liquid long-term fixed-income markets.
On the other hand, indexation also has macroeconomic implica-
tions. In particular, indexation has played a critical role in many
stabilization programs. The academic literature regarding this point
is not without controversy. Supporters of indexation claim that au-
tomatic price adjustments facilitate the reduction of inflation and
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the stabilization of output in the presence of monetary shocks.
But indexation has its detractors as well. The standard case against
indexation is built on the premise that indexation to past inflation
increases inflationary inertia, tending to perpetuate inflation and
making rapid, low-cost stabilization less likely. It has also been
argued that exchange rate–based stabilization programs in coun-
tries suffering from stubbornly persistent inflation—to which in-
dexation may contribute—are doomed to fail by causing a real
overvaluation of the domestic currency (Goldfajn and Valdés, 1999;
Fischer, 2001).
The recent history of the Chilean economy provides fertile
ground for assessing the extent and impact of indexation, from
both the macroeconomic and the microeconomic viewpoint. Chile
has had it all: indexation of private contracts including wages, house
rentals, tuition, and health insurance; indexation of financial in-
struments such as consumer loans, mortgages, corporate bonds,
and indeed almost all fixed-income securities with a maturity be-
yond one quarter; and indexation of policy instruments such as
exchange rates, interest rates on public debt, income tax brack-
ets, and public sector wages.
The development of these indexation mechanisms beginning in
the 1960s was undoubtedly a rational response to high inflation.
However, in the wake of this generalized indexation, inflation was
reduced massively during the 1990s. The policy implemented by the
newly independent central bank attained a reduction in annual con-
sumer price inflation from 27 percent in 1990 to 3 percent in 2001.
At the beginning of the 1990s, policymakers saw it as impor-
tant to reduce the widespread prevalence of indexation based on
past inflation, and especially its role in determining the prices of
nontradable goods, wages, the nominal exchange rate, and inter-
est rates. Consequently, in September 1990 the Central Bank of
Chile adopted a monetary framework based on public announce-
ment of an explicit, forward-looking annual inflation target. Today
there is wide agreement that this significant change in monetary
regime has contributed to a gradual decline in inflation to levels
consistent with a permanent target range of 2 to 4 percent per
year (Loayza and Soto, 2002). This was attained only recently, how-
ever, when inflation targeting was perfected by the adoption of a
flexible exchange rate system and significant improvements in the
transparency and accountability of monetary policy.
The Central Bank of Chile recently introduced two further
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nominalization of interest rates on short-term central bank debt,
and nominalization of the monetary policy interest rate. The cen-
tral bank started issuing nonindexed short-term domestic debt of
forty-two days’ and of ninety days’ maturity in July 1997. Place-
ment of these issues at fixed nominal interest rates has been very
successful on four counts. First, financial markets have received
them well, as reflected in low inflation risk premiums. Second,
these issues help in completing Chile’s financial markets, adding
nominal debt instruments to the existing ninety-day indexed debt.
Third, this placement provides the public and the monetary au-
thority with direct information about inflation expectations (in-
cluding the inflation risk premium). Last but not least, the
placement of nominal debt represents an important step toward
the nominalization of short-term financial instruments issued by
the private sector.
By 2001, inflation expectations in Chile had stabilized at levels
consistent with the official target range of 2 to 4 percent. In August
of that year the central bank took an additional step toward
nominalization, setting its main monetary policy instrument, the over-
night interbank loan rate, in nominal terms. The bank also started to
issue 30, 60, and 90-day nominal debt and stopped issuing 90-day
indexed debt, replacing it with 360-day indexed debt. Hence the mar-
ket for short-term indexed financial instruments has been partially
replaced by the market for nonindexed debt, and this development
is supported by much less volatile nominal interest rates.
Despite these policy changes, however, the Chilean economy
remains highly indexed, especially in the medium-term fixed-in-
come financial market and in the markets for nontraded goods
and services and for labor. In the absence of strong reasons or
incentives to abandon indexation, even under conditions of low
and stable inflation, agents in these markets tend to stick to their
decades-long habits of indexation based on past inflation. Hyster-
esis in indexation thus mimics hysteresis in currency and asset
dollarization, the alternative response to high inflation observed
in many countries.
This volume contributes to the literature on indexation and in-
flation by publishing nine new papers that are at the research fron-
tier on these issues. Their scope ranges from analyses of specific
topics, such as the optimal management of indexed public debt and
the consequences of wage indexation, to presentations of recent
empirical evidence regarding indexation and inflation persistence.4 Fernando Lefort and Klaus Schmidt-Hebbel
The papers are revised versions of papers presented at the First
Annual Conference of the Central Bank of Chile, on “Indexation,
Inflation, and Monetary Policy,” held in Santiago in August 1997.
This introduction reviews the issues addressed by the various
papers, in the context of the related academic and policy litera-
ture. First, we look at specific indexation practices adopted in dif-
ferent markets in response to inflation and their consequences for
those markets. Here we discuss the creation of artificial indexed
units of account as well as the indexation of wages, financial in-
struments, and public debt. Second, we discuss the relationship
between indexation practices, inflation persistence, and the out-
come of stabilization programs. In this context we also reconsider
the question of the appropriate choice of monetary policy regime
in a deindexed, low-inflation economy.
The first paper, written by Oscar Landerretche, Fernando Lefort,
and Rodrigo Valdés, can be seen as a direct extension of this intro-
duction. The authors provide a comprehensive review of the theo-
retical literature on indexation that, unlike other surveys on this
subject, analyzes the effects of indexation in specific markets on
aggregate inflation. It thus updates and complements previous sur-
veys, including those of Van Gompel (1994), who emphasizes labor
market indexation; Campbell and Shiller (1996), who focus on finan-
cial indexation; and Dornbusch and Simonsen (1983), who look at
the relationship between indexation and inflation in general. The
paper examines the theoretical literature and policy dimensions of
the three main categories of indexation: wage indexation, financial
indexation, and exchange rate indexation. The authors identify the
causes of each type of indexation and its consequences both for the
corresponding market and for the broader economy. They then ana-
lyze the effects of each type of indexation on the inflation process as
well as on the costs of stabilization and the authorities’ willingness
to adopt a stabilization program.
1. INDEXATION PRACTICES AND THEIR EFFECTS
Price indexation of policy instruments, labor, and financial con-
tracts can be considered a rational response, observed in many coun-
tries, to persistent inflation. Market participants and policymakers
have devised various indexation mechanisms as means of protec-
tion, to reduce the costs of high and variable inflation. We begin byIndexation, Inflation, and Monetary Policy: An Overview 5
reviewing the main indexation practices and their implications for
policy instruments and market behavior.
1.1 Choosing an Indexed Unit of Account
Many economies have faced high inflation at one point or another
in their history. When inflation rises to two- or three-digit levels,
market transactions and contracts become disrupted. As inflation
erodes real values and misaligns relative prices, agents are re-
quired to reset prices and renegotiate contracts with increasing
frequency. At some point, to reduce the need for constant read-
justments, prices and contracts begin to be quoted in a unit of
account that is not affected by domestic inflation. Selecting an
indexed unit of account involves separation of the first two func-
tions of money—as a medium of exchange and as a store of value—
from its third function, that of a unit of account. Of course, this
can be done in many different ways. Several countries experienc-
ing high inflation have chosen a foreign currency as their unit of
account (and often as a store of value as well) while retaining local
money as the medium of exchange. Substitution of the U.S. dollar
for local currencies and in the denomination of asset prices is ob-
served in several Latin American countries, including many that
have achieved low inflation. Hysteresis of de facto dollarization is
widespread, making it very difficult to reintroduce the domestic
currency after currency and asset substitution have taken place
(Calvo and Végh, 1992).
The paper by Robert J. Shiller in this volume analyzes the expe-
rience of the Chilean Unidad de Fomento (UF), an artificial unit of
account that provides an alternative to adopting a foreign currency.
Adopted in 1967, the UF was the world’s first successful inflation-
indexed unit of account. It was later adopted by Colombia, Ecuador,
and Mexico. Shiller, following the pioneering work of Irving Fisher
(1911, 1928, 1934), analyses the factors that led to the creation of
the Chilean UF.
There are several lessons to be learned from the Chilean experi-
ence. For example, the UF is linked to a price index, the official
consumer price index (CPI), that attempts to measure the true cost
of living in Chile. Therefore, when debts and other obligations are
denominated in UF, they are held constant in terms of purchasing
power. Using the dollar as an alternative unit of account would not
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international purchasing power parity from holding. At the same
time, the government’s adoption of an indexed unit of account solves
a coordination problem that otherwise could inhibit indexation or
trigger the use of the dollar. The UF has additional features that
may appear secondary but in fact have contributed to its success.
For instance, the daily proportion of the lagged monthly CPI change
is reflected in the daily value of the UF, contributing to its wide-
spread use in daily transactions.
In sum, Shiller is enthusiastic about the Chilean UF. He ar-
gues that using this indexed accounting unit solves important prac-
tical problems that arise when financial indexation is not introduced
despite conditions of moderate to high inflation. However, one im-
portant caveat in adopting an indexed unit of account is that it
may contribute to more sticky inflation expectations and greater
inflation inertia. Despite the latter danger, Shiller recommends
its use in other countries, including the United States. However,
in countries that have achieved relatively low inflation, one might
also consider using units of account indexed to nominal income, to
attain a superior sharing of risks across different generations.
Shiller argues that an alternative unit, indexed to wages, as was
considered in Chile and is currently being used in Uruguay, may
also provide a suitable instrument of indexation. This leads us to
consider the more general issue of wage indexation next.
1.2 Wage Indexation
Under moderate to high inflation, wage contracts tend to include
arrangements between workers and employers that remove the need
for continuous renegotiation and recalculation of wages in response
to inflation shocks. High costs of wage renegotiation favor lengthen-
ing the duration of labor contracts. As shown by Gray (1978) and
Aizenman (1984), wage indexation allows a reduction in the frequency
of wage renegotiation by keeping real wages relatively constant. Wage
indexation is also justified as a risk-sharing mechanism. Here the
idea, as formalized by Baily (1974) and Azariadis (1975), is that more
risk-averse workers are willing to accept real wages paid by their
less risk-averse employers that are lower than those observed in the
spot job market, as long as the workers are offered a mechanism that
keeps real wages unchanged when unexpected inflation shocks oc-
cur. Of course, wage indexation mechanisms also generate the poten-
tial for redistribution between employers and employees. The paperIndexation, Inflation, and Monetary Policy: An Overview 7
by Landerretche, Lefort, and Valdés in this volume provides a more
detailed discussion of this topic.
Views on wage indexation largely depend on the form of wage
indexation being considered. The literature (for example, Aizenman,
1987) has emphasized that wage indexation must entail mechanisms
that allow wages to adjust automatically to new information without
having to renegotiate the terms of the contract. Therefore it is not
sufficient simply to take inflation into account when setting wages.
The paper by Esteban Jadresic in this volume focuses on the impli-
cations of wage indexation for macroeconomic stabilization pro-
grams, a topic discussed further below. Jadresic also discusses in
detail the different categories of wage indexation mechanisms. He
makes a crucial distinction between wages that are indexed to
current inflation, as in Gray’s (1976) original analysis, and wages
indexed to lagged inflation, as frequently observed in actual wage
contracts.
1.3 Financial Indexation
The Unidad de Fomento was introduced in January 1967 by
the Chilean Superintendency of Banks and Financial Institutions,
the government agency in charge of the regulation and supervi-
sion of banks and other financial institutions. The intent was to
provide an indexed unit of account in which long-term financial
instruments could be denominated. It is clear that indexing finan-
cial instruments provides protection against inflation risk and
therefore helps to complete financial markets. As pointed out by
Campbell and Shiller (1996), there are other ways to protect fi-
nancial investments from inflation risk. A standard procedure con-
sists in rolling over short-term securities, since their nominal rates
quickly adjust to inflation shocks. However, a series of rolled-over
short-term securities is not equivalent to a single long-term in-
dexed instrument, because the latter also provides insurance
against changes in the real interest rate. Such insurance is of par-
ticular value for investments of long duration, including pension
savings and mortgages.
Financial indexation has other benefits as well. One is that the
coexistence of nominal and indexed bonds that are otherwise iden-
tical (including identical maturities) provides a measure of market
expectations of inflation (strictly speaking, the sum of inflation ex-
pectations and the inflation risk premium). Another benefit
is that the existence of indexed long-term securities provides an8 Fernando Lefort and Klaus Schmidt-Hebbel
incentive to increase financial savings. The recent experience of
Chile, the United Kingdom, and the United States, starting from
very different initial conditions, reflects these benefits. In Chile,
where all medium- to long-term debt was indexed, the central bank
has started issuing one-year nominal bonds that complement ex-
isting indexed bonds. In the United Kingdom and the United States,
where long-term indexed government paper was nonexistent, both
governments started issuing long-term indexed bonds in the 1990s
(Breedon, 1995).
The paper by Eduardo Walker in this volume reviews the Chil-
ean experience with financial indexation. He shows that index-
ation of financial markets has contributed to the development of
Chile’s capital markets. Of course, indexation alone is not enough.
Walker argues that three specific reforms are required to comple-
ment the adoption of an indexed unit of account: lifting financial
repression and liberalizing interest rates, reforming the tax code
to achieve inflation neutrality, and creating effective supervisory
institutions. Walker and Lefort (1999) add to this list the adoption
of a sound macroeconomic environment, privatization of public
enterprises, and privatization of the pension system.
Walker’s paper provides empirical evidence that creation of
an indexed fixed-income market has also contributed to the devel-
opment of Chile’s stock market. Moreover, he shows that short-
and long-term indexed bonds provide unique and relevant yield
patterns that cannot be replicated by international markets. There-
fore they constitute an effective way of completing financial mar-
kets. Walker argues that in the absence of a government-backed
UF, Chilean capital markets would have relied on foreign currency
to protect against inflation, and the maturities of peso-denomi-
nated securities would have been much shorter. The paper also
provides empirical evidence regarding the optimal portfolio com-
position needed to hedge specific sector risks in the Chilean
economy. Walker concludes by suggesting that, given the exist-
ence of indexed financial instruments in Chile, central bank asset
holdings should include long-term U.S. public debt and equities
from other emerging economies, and investment in fixed-income
foreign securities by local investors is not advisable.
1.4 Indexed Public Debt
An indexed unit of account opens the door to the issuance of
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the inflation bias of a central bank, reflected by its incentive to erode
the real value of public debt, declines with the level of indexed public
debt. Hence issuing such debt is a signal of the central bank’s com-
mitment to achieve low inflation.
On the other hand, the possibility of issuing indexed debt in
addition to nominal and foreign-currency debt raises issues for the
optimal management of public debt. In addition to deciding the ma-
turity structure or contingent payments of such debt, policymakers
must now make decisions about its denomination. Two papers in
this volume contribute to the literature on this topic. The paper by
Robert J. Barro analyzes public debt management from the point of
view of public finance theory. The author focuses on the structure
of public debt under the assumption that the government aims at
tax smoothing when facing a stochastic sequence of exogenous gov-
ernment expenditure. This work is related to earlier work by Barro
(1979), Lucas and Stokey (1983), and Persson and Svensson (1984),
but unlike the last two contributions, it assumes that the govern-
ment can effectively commit itself to future fiscal actions, and
thus the resulting composition of the debt is not necessarily time
consistent.
Barro analyzes optimal public debt management at three levels.
First, the optimal level of public debt cannot be determined for the
extreme case where taxes are not distortionary and other condi-
tions of Ricardian equivalence hold. Second, if taxes are distortionary,
then tax rates should be smoothened over time; hence the optimal
level of public debt is determinate, but its composition by maturity
or by category (indexed versus nonindexed) is not. Third, the opti-
mal composition of debt can only be determined under conditions of
uncertainty regarding fiscal or macroeconomic variables. Under the
latter condition, Barro’s paper derives some interesting conclusions.
On the one hand, if the government can issue debt contingent on
the level of outlays, all noncontingent debt should be issued as an
indexed consol. The idea is to achieve a maturity structure of the
noncontingent debt without any gaps. Then the author looks at the
optimal debt structure when contingent debt is not available. Un-
der such conditions the optimal structure can be attained by issuing
indexed bonds with longer maturities than a standard consol. Con-
sistent with the idea that the optimal debt structure will take the
form of long-term indexed bonds, some developed countries such as
the United States and the United Kingdom started issuing indexed
long-term public debt instruments in the 1990s, as noted above.10 Fernando Lefort and Klaus Schmidt-Hebbel
Related literature on this topic, such as Bohn (1990) and Calvo
and Guidotti (1990), argues that since inflation and current govern-
ment outlays are positively correlated, nominal public debt may be
desirable in order to exploit the negative covariance between infla-
tion and the real value of debt. In his paper, however, Barro disputes
this argument. If there are no moral hazard problems regarding pub-
lic sector behavior, and therefore nominal debt can be issued at no
extra cost, it seems much more convenient to issue only explicit contin-
gent debt and indexed debt.
The paper by Ilan Goldfajn in this volume complements the pre-
ceding discussion with an analysis of the Brazilian case. His paper
examines a model for optimum management of debt by the public
sector, considering three types of debt: nominal, CPI-indexed, and
foreign currency–denominated debt. Like Bohn (1990) and Calvo and
Guidotti (1990), who consider the nonfeasibility of issuing explicit con-
tingent debt, Goldfajn’s model predicts that the main factors deter-
mining debt composition are the inflation variance, total outstanding
debt, the nominal exchange rate variance, and the correlations be-
tween inflation and public revenue and expenditure. The empirical
findings reported by Goldfajn for the case of Brazil tend to confirm
these hypotheses. The intuition for these results is that the main
benefit of indexed debt is in stabilizing the real value of debt and
eliminating the temptation to inflate it away. On the other hand, and
for the same underlying reason, nominal debt serves as implicit con-
tingent debt, and its importance should increase with the correlation
between inflation and public net expenditure. Finally, foreign currency–
denominated debt should be issued when real exchange rates are not
excessively volatile and the correlation between real exchange shocks
and government outlays is negative. The application of this model to
Brazil’s experience is relatively successful in explaining the relative
composition of that country’s public debt during the past decade.
2. INDEXATION AND MACROECONOMIC STABILIZATION
Indexation of wages, prices, and policy instruments also in-
volves costs. In particular, it contributes to inflation inertia, mak-
ing it slower and harder to reduce inflation and amplifying the
inflationary impact of adverse price shocks. The cost-benefit ratio
of indexation becomes unfavorable when a formerly high-inflation
country achieves moderate to low inflation, as the benefits of in-
dexation are diluted while its costs rise.Indexation, Inflation, and Monetary Policy: An Overview 11
In recent years several developing countries (including Brazil,
Chile, Mexico, and Israel) have implemented successful macroeco-
nomic stabilization programs, including as part of their reform
package the deindexation of wages, the use of the exchange rate
as the economy’s nominal anchor, or both.
2.1 Indexation and the Persistence of Inflation
We noted at the outset the claim by critics of indexation that
indexation, especially to past inflation, increases the persistence
of inflation and makes it much harder to achieve macroeconomic
stabilization. Bruno (1993) and Edwards (1993) argue that the persis-
tence of inflation, partly caused by indexation practices, may have
jeopardized the success of exchange rate–based stabilization programs,
because such practices are bound to generate a real overvaluation of
the currency and may contribute to balance of payments crises.
The paper by Sebastian Edwards and Fernando Lefort in this
volume seeks to increase our understanding of the empirical rela-
tionship between indexation practices and inflation and its persis-
tence. The authors analyze and estimate inflation persistence over
time in sixteen developing and industrial countries. Their empirical
evidence suggests that persistence varies greatly across countries
and, for a given country, over time. This finding is in contrast with a
standard assumption in the literature, notably by Fuhrer and Moore
(1995), that measurement of the effect of wage indexation on infla-
tion persistence requires that such persistence be time invariant.
Edwards and Lefort also provide conclusive evidence on the
relationship between the degree of inflationary persistence and
the level of inflation. They show that the higher a country’s infla-
tion, the more inflationary inertia is present. More important for
the question of the effect of indexation on the success of stabiliza-
tion, they also present evidence indicating that inflationary per-
sistence rises with the degree of indexation. Finally, the paper
provides a detailed study of inflationary inertia in repeated ex-
change rate–based stabilizations in Chile, Israel, and Mexico. The
authors show that inflationary persistence tends to decline with
the adoption of a stabilization program, but to rise again as time
passes. They ascribe this result to indexation practices based on
past inflation, which persist after stabilization has been imple-
mented, and to the lack of credibility of the exchange rate–based
stabilization program.12 Fernando Lefort and Klaus Schmidt-Hebbel
2.2 Macroeconomic Consequences of Wage and
Price Indexation
The empirical evidence just discussed indicates that the adop-
tion of indexation practices tends to increase the persistence of
inflation, making stabilization more difficult. This is in contrast to
the claims of economists during the 1970s, when it was asserted
that indexation actually favored output stabilization and inflation
reduction. Friedman (1974), Gray (1976), and Fischer (1977) reached
the conclusion that indexation helps in stabilizing output when mon-
etary shocks dominate real shocks. Consistent with this line of ar-
gument, Ball (1994) showed that greater wage flexibility—measured
by an indicator that averages contract duration, degree of index-
ation, and degree of synchronization—reduced the sacrifice ratio
during stabilization programs. To make this empirical result consis-
tent with the findings of Edwards and Lefort in this volume, one
must consider that Ball focused exclusively on periods of time and
economies where stabilization programs were being implemented,
whereas Edwards and Lefort look at the general relationship be-
tween indexation practices and inflation persistence, independent
of whether a stabilization program was under way. In addition, Ball’s
measure of wage flexibility is affected not only by the degree of
indexation, but also by other features of wage contracts.
In any case, Simonsen (1983) and others after him have criti-
cized the argument by Friedman and others on the grounds that
actual indexation practices have amounted to lagged and uncoordi-
nated indexation rather than the instantaneous and synchronized
type that the latter authors assumed. This distinction is important,
since it implies that wages indexed to lagged inflation imply nomi-
nal rather than real wage rigidity. Accordingly, Fischer developed a
line of research (Fischer, 1977, 1985, 1988) that analyzes the precise
consequences of wage indexation for output stabilization.
Two of the papers in this volume contribute to this literature.
The study by Esteban Jadresic reexamines the macroeconomic con-
sequences of wage indexation, taking into explicit account specific
lag structures used in actual wage contracts indexed to past infla-
tion. He analyzes the effects of these lags on aggregate wage for-
mation, the cost of deflation, output variability, and inflation, under
different shocks and policy regimes. He addresses specifically the
interaction between wage indexation practices and exchange rate
regimes at different levels of inflation. The paper shows that,Indexation, Inflation, and Monetary Policy: An Overview 13
unlike the (unrealistic) case in which wage increases are based on
contemporary inflation, wage indexation based on past inflation can
increase the cost of disinflation, destabilize output, and, when the
central bank is not firmly committed to keeping inflation low, in-
crease inflation. This paper also compares the effects of wage in-
dexation based on past inflation with those of other rules for adjusting
wages. Jadresic’s main conclusion is that when actual wage index-
ation rules are modeled, their consequences for output and price
stabilization tend to be as most policymakers believe: wage index-
ation increases the costs of disinflation. A contribution of Jadresic’s
paper, compared with similar work by Bonomo and Garcia (1994), is
that the latter consider only the case of gradual and credible poli-
cies that contribute to output expansion. Jadresic’s work extends
the analysis to different classes of stabilization programs under vari-
ous conditions.
The paper by Luis Oscar Herrera in this volume offers a comple-
mentary perspective, analyzing the relationship between automatic
indexation of prices and wages and the cost of inflation reduction.
Herrera derives an extended aggregate supply model by including
automatic cost-of-living adjustment clauses in prices (or wages)
based on past inflation, which he uses to examine stabilization costs.
He assesses a number of stabilization plans that vary according to
how gradual or credible they were, and he derives the impact of
the frequency of indexation on these costs. The paper’s main re-
sults suggest that the inertia introduced by indexation raises the
cost of stabilizing inflation. That cost is much attenuated, how-
ever, when price stabilization is implemented gradually and cred-
ibly. In the various stabilization cases analyzed in the paper, the
relationship between the frequency of indexation and the cost of
stabilization follows an inverted U curve. Hence costs are lower
when wage indexation is absent or infrequent and when it is very
frequent, and highest at intermediate frequencies ranging from
three to six months. The implication is that less frequent index-
ation does not necessarily lower sacrifice ratios, because whether
or not it does so depends on the starting point. Another interest-
ing application of these results is their contribution to explaining
the persistence of moderate inflation processes. As inflation be-
comes chronic, the price and wage indexation that normally ac-
companies inflation tends to raise the cost of price stabilization.
This increase reduces the political willingness to deal with infla-
tion, thus contributing to its persistence.14 Fernando Lefort and Klaus Schmidt-Hebbel
2.3 Indexation and Monetary Policy
As already mentioned, Chilean policymakers have deindexed sev-
eral of their monetary policy instruments in the recent past. When
inflation fell to 3 percent a year, it became clear that the rationale
for deindexation was not only to lock in low inflation but also to
conduct monetary policy more effectively in a setting where real
shocks become increasingly important.
Central bankers in developing economies, following the lead of
many of their counterparts in industrial economies, have started us-
ing short-term interest rates as their main instrument for conduct-
ing monetary policy. This practice raises the question of whether a
particular monetary regime is better suited than others for conduct-
ing monetary policy in a low-inflation environment. The shift of mon-
etary regimes, in many industrial and developing countries alike, from
targets based on the exchange rate or monetary growth to targets
based on inflation, justifies an analytical approach to this question.
Most inflation-targeting countries use short-term interest rates as
their policy instruments. (See Loayza and Soto, 2002, for recent stud-
ies on the worldwide experience with inflation targeting.)
The paper by Carlos Végh in this volume analyzes the costs
and benefits of different monetary regimes and policy rules in a
setting like the one just described. Végh derives some basic equiva-
lences for alternative monetary policy rules. He shows that under
conditions of inflation inertia, the following three rules are exactly
equivalent: a fixed growth rate of a monetary aggregate; a nomi-
nal interest rate combined with an inflation target; and a real in-
terest rate combined with an inflation target. However, he also
shows that implementation of these rules becomes increasingly
complex. The first rule does not require a feedback or policy rule
on the part of the central bank. The second rule is based on the
central bank’s response to the inflation gap. The third rule re-
quires the central bank to respond to both the inflation gap and
the output gap, as in a conventional Taylor-type policy. (See Tay-
lor, 2002, and Loayza and Schmidt-Hebbel, 2002, for recent ana-
lytical and empirical studies of policy rules.) If the country aims to
reduce stabilization costs, all three rules must respond to the out-
put gap. From the policy perspective, the worldwide trend toward
substituting nominal interest rules for monetary aggregate growth
targets may reflect both the equivalence between the rules de-
scribed in this paper and the well-known practical difficulties in
controlling monetary aggregates under standard conditions of in-
stability of money demand.Indexation, Inflation, and Monetary Policy: An Overview 15
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